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Assault on the State and on 
the Market: Neoliberalism and 
Economic Theory
LUIZ CARLOS BRESSER-PEREIRA
The idea of a self-adjusting market implied a stark 
utopia. Such an institution could not exist for any 
length of time without annihilating the human and 
natural substance of society; it would have physically 
destroyed man and transformed his surroundings 
into a wilderness.
(Karl Polanyi, 1944)
THE OPPOSITION between the State and marketplace is a part of the neoliberal agenda that only became a problem in our time when, in the 1980s and 1990s, Neoliberalism grew so hegemonic that its program 
came to seem as both natural and legitimate. This opposition, furthermore, 
placed on the same level two institutions that, by their very nature and 
structure, are complementary in modern society. The State is the constitutional-
legal system and the organizations that guarantee it; it is, therefore, the 
fundamental institution of every society, the matrix of all other institutions, 
the coordinating or regulating principle with power over society as a whole, 
and the political apparatus by which it is permanently executed and amended. 
While societal actions are coordinated by law (that is, by the juridical order), 
public administration is what guarantees this coordination. The market, 
on the other hand, is a more limited, but equally fundamental institution: 
it is the mechanism of economic competition regulated by the State that, 
rather automatically, coordinates economic actions; it is the institution that 
complements the broader coordination carried out by the State. It makes no 
sense, therefore, to oppose State and market. We may acknowledge problems in 
the State, we may understand that certain activities might be better coordinated 
if the State limited its regulation of the market, but we would be wrong to see 
both forms of coordination as alternatives, because the State will always regulate 
markets and because ultimate responsibility for good or bad coordination 
will not be the market’s, which has no will of its own, but society’s – which, 
through its distinct forms of political organization (the civil society or nation), 
constitutes a State and, in the democratic State, elects its government.
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Modern societies are capitalist societies that organize their territory in 
sovereign countries or nation-States. Today, within the framework of global 
capitalism, empires and areas previously occupied by tribes and clans have 
disappeared, and the entire planet is covered with nation-States that compose 
a broader and evolving world political system. As countries have opened their 
markets to international trade, globalization has transformed the world into 
a great marketplace – into one large and increasingly integrated economic 
system, where the political-territorial unit is the nation-State, comprising a 
nation (or civil society), a State and a territory. A country that is developed in 
the economic, social and political realms is a nation well served by a strong 
State capable of regulating a free and effi cient market. The State and the market 
are, therefore, institutions of society – its instruments of collective action and 
the main tools for each society to achieve its goals. The primary instrument 
is the State; the market, socially constructed and politically regulated, is its 
complement. The stronger one institution is, the stronger the other will be.
Neoliberalism
It is vain to attempt to increase the power of the market by weakening 
the State, as the neoliberal ideology has irrationally aspired to do. When, after 
associating itself with seemingly scientifi c economic and political theories, 
Neoliberalism orchestrated a veritable assault on the social and democratic State 
that began to be established with the New Deal in the United States and was 
consolidated particularly in post-WWII Europe, the market also came under 
assault, because, in the absence of regulation, it ceased to carry out its function 
in society and become demoralized. Neoliberals and people guided by common 
sense will probably claim that the dominant ideology of the last 30 years – 
which for this very reason became commonsensical – did not seek to weaken 
the State, but merely to remove it from the productive realm; they wanted the 
State to cease being a “producer” and become a “regulator”. To be sure, part 
of what they said seemed to corroborate this, yet their words were empty. Their 
discourse was classical Orwellian doublespeak that says the opposite of what one 
actually means. The fundamental role of the State is, indeed, that of regulator, 
defi ning and establishing itself as the constitutional-legal system. But the State 
can also be a protector, an inducer, an enabler and, in the initial stages of 
economic development, a producer. Neoliberalism not only rejected a State with 
these qualities – qualities that distinguished or were beginning to characterize 
the social and democratic State of capitalism’s “30 glorious years” (1945-1975) 
– but also did not want a regulatory State. The name “regulatory State” was 
vacuous. Its goal was to deregulate, not regulate. For Neoliberalism, the State 
should become “minimal”, and this meant at least four things: safety net, 
namely, the entire protective system through which modern societies seek to 
remedy the blindness of the market regarding social justice; third, it should stop 
inducing productive investment and technological & scientifi c development, 
ESTUDOS AVANÇADOS 23 (66), 2009 9
that is, it should relinquish leadership of a national development strategy; and, 
fourth, it should stop regulating the markets and, in particular, the fi nancial 
markets, deemed to be self-regulating. The most insistently repeated proposal 
of the Neoliberal creed has been the deregulation of the marketplace. How 
could it be possible, then, to speak of a regulatory State? Much better, and 
more forthright, would be to say “deregulatory State”. What neoliberals aspired 
to, both in rich countries where their ideology emerged and in the developing 
world, was a weak State that allowed national economies to become a playing 
fi eld for large corporations, their top executives and fi nancial agents to obtain 
all kinds of rents – in lieu of moderate interest rates, fair business profi ts and 
professional wages, the legitimate forms of reasonably the economic elites.
Neoliberalism was the hegemonic ideology from the early 1980s to 
the early 2000s. It was the ideology adopted and promoted by American 
governments since Ronald Reagan. After the turn of the century, however, its 
intrinsic irrationality, its failure to encourage economic growth in developing 
countries, its effi cacy in concentrating income for the richest 2% of every rich 
or developing society that adopted its ideas, and the increased macroeconomic 
instability (as shown by the successive fi nancial crises of the 1990s) became 
clear indications of the exhaustion of Neoliberalism. Is it possible that, by 
forcing the State to intervene so forcibly to rescue indebted banks, companies 
and families, the crash of October 2008 and the ongoing economic and 
fi nancial crisis might represent the collapse of this ideology – the end of its 
hegemony? The much-disparaged State was fi nally called upon to save the 
market… Neoliberalism today is a dead ideology, an embarrassing remembrance 
that owes its spectral existence only to the nefarious consequences it had on 
the societies it victimized. Am I, perhaps, being unfair with Neoliberalism and 
with the neoliberals? Having myself been always critical of this ideology, I call 
upon the testimony of someone wholly unsuspected, Francis Fukuyama (2004), 
a conservative but not a neoliberal, who in his book, State-building: governance 
and world order in the 21st century, vigorously criticizes the neoliberal policies 
imposed by the United States on less developed countries, particularly in Africa. 
He showed how such policies failed states1. I am aware that failed nation-States 
are a borderline case, but borderline cases can help us to clarify ambiguous 
situations that so often prevail in society.
For a long time, I defi ned Neoliberalism as radical economic liberalism, 
as the ideology of minimal State and self-regulated markets. Although these 
defi nitions are correct, the fi rst poses a rather serious problem. After all, both 
political and economic liberalism were social conquests – and we’ve had many 
forms of radical liberalism that were not in the least neoliberal.2 It is better 
to defi ne Neoliberalism by making a historical comparison with Liberalism. 
Liberalism, in the 18th century, was the ideology of a bourgeois middle class 
struggling against an oligarchy of landowners and weapons masters supported 
by an autocratic State. Therefore, if we wish to characterize Neoliberalism, a 
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reactionary ideology, it is not enough to say that it is a radical type of economic 
liberalism, because the liberal radicalism of the 18th and early 19th century 
was revolutionary. Let us, then, attempt to see what Neoliberalism is or was 
historically. Neoliberalism is the ideology that the wealthy used in the late 
20th century against the poor, the workers and a social democratic State. It is, 
therefore, an eminently reactionary ideology. It is an ideology that, bolstered by 
the neoclassical economic theory of rational expectations, by the so-called new 
institutionalism, by the theory of public choice and by the more radical forms 
of the rational choice school, orchestrated a veritable political and theoretical 
assault against the State and against regulated markets over the last 30 years. 
As a result, if we compare this period with the immediately preceding years, 
we will see that in the rich countries growth rates were reduced, fi nancial and 
economic instability was increased and income become concentrated among the 
wealthiest 2% of the population. As for the developing countries that accepted 
the ideology – the followers of the Washington consensus –, growth rates were 
insuffi cient for them to even hope catching up.
State
The great institutional construction of modern societies is the 
State. Hegel was the fi rst to understand this fact, to see it as the ultimate 
crystallization of reason, as the loftiest endeavor of human rationality. For us, 
it diffi cult to understand the claims of the great philosopher’s, because we see 
our own State as an imperfect normative institution, always needy of reforms 
(the constitutional-legal system), and as an organizational institution peopled 
by public servants and politicians replete with administrative and ethical 
problems (the apparatus of the State or public administration). These, however, 
are merely differences between design and reality that do not disavow the State 
as a construct of human will, as the ultimate pursuit of rationality. Whereas 
the economy and society conceived with no heed to the State remain in the 
realm of necessity, politics and the State are the realm of freedom and human 
will. In the economy and in society, everyone defends their own interests and 
only secondarily cooperates with others – and both actions are carried out in 
a rather disorderly manner. There are no common goals, no collective choices. 
In this scenario, individuals are guided solely by their reason to fulfi ll their 
own self-interests. Because of this, when economists who defi ne themselves as 
liberals [i.e., as conservatives in the American sense] seek to develop theories 
about society and the economy without considering politics and the State, they 
inevitably fall into the perversion of determinism. Determinism is a proper 
doctrine in the natural sciences, but it lures economists by making their science 
more “scientifi c”, apparently more precise or seemingly better equipped to 
provide explanations. In reality, however, economics and other social sciences 
can only be rendered deterministic through a radical simplifi cation of human 
behavior that is intrinsically misleading, because there is always an element of 
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freedom and unpredictability in each human being and because social behavior 
is never the mere sum of individual behaviors. Brought together in society, 
individuals share values and beliefs and build institutions that themselves 
change the patterns of social behavior. It is by establishing a legitimate and 
effective constitutional-legal system – the State – and by means of other social 
institutions that citizens can transform their society and build their Republic in 
accordance with those values. 
When attempting to understand society and the economy, we must 
always consider the State as well, its government and other institutions. As 
Karl Polanyi (1944, p. 33) said: “Economic liberalism misread the history of 
the Industrial Revolution because it insisted on judging social events from 
the economic viewpoint”, because it believed in the “spontaneity” of social 
change and ignored the “elementary truths” of “political science and statecraft”. 
Although concerned with their own interests, citizens can be called free when, 
in addition to this, they show themselves capable of regulating society and the 
economy, of organizing the common good, of building their nation and their 
State; in short, of changing their fate for the better. Success in this undertaking 
is always relative – but, if we believe in progress, we should reject pessimism 
and cynicism, and remember that the realm of freedom will slowly impose itself 
upon the realm of necessity, and that humankind, by constructing the State, 
will gradually give rise to national societies and a world society that are more 
prosperous, freer, fairer and environmentally-friendly. The social or welfare State 
and the social capitalism that European societies (particularly in Scandinavia) 
have built are far from paradisiacal, but they are a very signifi cant sign of 
progress. This does not mean that citizens of those countries can afford to give 
themselves over to self-complacency. On the contrary, they remain engaged 
in an ongoing critique of their States’ practices and institutions, this being 
the only way to advance a perpetually evolving construction. Regarding this 
point, I always remember a German social scientist who, during a seminar in a 
developing country with much more serious social and economic problems than 
Germany’s, embarked on a ferocious critical analysis of his own native land. The 
other participants were taken aback, because they were used to criticizing their 
own society but saw the more advanced countries as something to emulate. In 
truth, however, a country and its society can only be deemed more advanced if 
its citizens have not lost their critical sense. Because they know that building 
a good society depends on the ability of each one to cooperate and commit 
to others; in particular, it depends on their ability to establish a good State in 
which social objectives and commitments have been embedded.
The State, as juridical order, is the concrete fulfi llment of human 
liberty and reason. It is our quintessential instrument of collective action. It is, 
however, an imperfect instrument, not only because we ourselves are imperfect, 
but especially because this “our” is never seen as belonging to everyone, not 
even considering Rousseau’s general will. Each society must learn who is the 
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“we” that builds the State and uses it as an instrument to reach “our” goals. 
When Marx and Engels, in the Communist manifesto, said the State was the 
executive committee of the bourgeoisie, they were detaching themselves from 
the State. They were denying the State rationality and legitimacy. And they 
were right, because the State of their time was authoritarian and “liberal”, 
upheld individual freedom but denied the political liberty of voting, being 
elected and participating in the government. They were right also because the 
two forms by which their society was politically organized to determine the 
actions of the State – nation and civil society – were themselves authoritarian, 
inasmuch as all the power remained concentrated in the hands of an emerging 
bourgeoisie and a decadent aristocracy. However, even at that time – or at that 
stage of development –, the constitution of a national State inevitably embraced 
the struggle of the poor and the workers, since the rising bourgeoisie needed 
them to attain independence or national autonomy, to form their own nation-
State, in other words. Even if they didn’t benefi t from the establishment of 
the national State, workers knew that the State would be or might become 
their instrument of collective action. That is why they fought for a national 
State and why they later fought for this State to take on a democratic form. 
Democracy doesn’t exist independent from the State; democracy is the political 
regime or constitutional system based on the right of people to take part in 
the government that the State underwrites. The more developed countries 
have a social and democratic State, because not only the State itself, but also 
civil society or the nation were internally democratized; because economic and 
political inequality has somehow diminished; and because, in modern societies 
and their respective States, the poor and the workers, even if they continue to 
have less voice than the elites, at least have attained some voice in defi ning the 
courses of collective action.
The modern State has regulated markets since its historical onset, the 
absolute State, which emerged from an alliance between landowning and 
military oligarchies and the emerging bourgeoisie. The liberal State came later – 
a victory of the bourgeoisie. The American liberal democracy and the European 
social democracy, on the other hand, were not born from the elites, but from 
the people. The bourgeois elites were content with the liberal State – the State 
that assured their civil rights. Who now demanded political participation, and 
obtained it in some measure, were the poor and the workers. The fi rst result was 
the liberal democratic State and, after World War II, the social democratic State 
in the European countries where workers achieved greater power. Unlike the 
pre-capitalistic elites and oligarchies, for whom democracy was unthinkable, the 
bourgeois elite did not impose an absolute veto on the democratic State during 
the transitional process of democratic consolidation, perhaps because they 
understood that they would be able to continue appropriating the economic 
surplus without direct control from the State (Bresser-Pereira, 2007). The 
democratic State that exists today, however, either in its liberal form or in the 
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more advanced social welfare form, is a conquest of the poor, of the workers 
and of the middles classes. And one of the roles of this State is, inevitably, 
to regulate markets. Therefore, it makes no sense to oppose the State to the 
market. Neoliberalism invented this opposition as a way to weaken a State 
that had transmogrifi ed into a social democratic State during the “30 glorious 
years” of capitalism (1945-1975) and also as way to transform capitalism into 
neoliberal capitalism.
Market
The market is a more modest institution than the State. As a 
competition-driven mechanism of coordination, it requires no defi nition 
of goals or objectives: the standards are defi ned by competitors in the 
competitive process itself. Furthermore, the market requires no authority, no 
administrative power to defi ne its goals and establish its means. Each company, 
each individual, is a competitor that makes decisions independently. For 
these reasons, the market is a marvelous institution. Without it, it would be 
impossible to coordinate the large and complex economic systems that capitalist 
development has produced. Only through the market – and, therefore, through 
price competition – is it possible to carry out a reasonably effective allocation 
of the human and material resources made available by these complex systems. 
Because of its tendency to even out (i.e., equalize) profi t rates, the market 
enables a satisfactory allocation of the factors of production. If the offering 
of capital, labor or knowledge in a certain industry is lower than the demand, 
prices soon increase; but, as the factors of production are redirected to satisfy 
this greater demand, the prices and remuneration of these factors return to a 
state of equilibrium.  The classical economists had already demonstrated the 
mechanism that Alfred Marshall’s theory of partial equilibrium made even 
clearer and more transparent.
Economic freedom and technical and business creativity, both of which 
are crucial for the development of complex societies, are only compatible if they 
are coordinated by the market. In the early stages of economic development, 
State intervention is indispensable to compel the requisite savings or primitive 
accumulation of capital for the industrial and capitalist revolution. The 
industrialization of Japan in the late 19th century was entirely carried out by 
the State, but around 1910 the country privatized its manufacturing industry. 
The initial development of the Soviet Union and China was done through State 
investment, even if their leaders believed they were making a socialist revolution 
(in reality, they were completing the fi rst stage of the capitalist revolution). The 
Soviet Union failed when competing with the United States because its State-
run regime, which had been adequate to drive the compulsory savings needed 
to implement the economic infrastructure, revealed itself inadequate for a more 
advanced stage of economic development. In Latin America, countries like Brazil 
and Mexico, managed to establish a broad economic infrastructure through 
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the direct action of the State and State-run companies, but soon opened their 
economies to market-coordinated private enterprise because this is the only 
effi cient option.
Yet, as much as the State, or even more so, this marvelous institution is 
imperfect. Quite imperfect, actually, because it is blind to fundamental political 
and human values – freedom, justice, protection of the environment – and blind 
even to the very same economic effi ciency that justifi es it. In certain times, 
particularly during crises, the market becomes incredibly ineffi cient. Economic 
crises are essentially failures of the market. They are instances when the market 
stops coordinating and begins to de-coordinate and disseminate disorder. It 
cannot do otherwise, as the market is the realm of economics – and, as we’ve 
seen, economics is the realm of necessity, not of freedom.
Economic theory is the science of the marketplace, or rather, the science 
of the marketplace as regulated by the State – that is why it is a political 
economy. Just as it makes no sense to have a market without a State that 
guarantees and regulates, it also makes no sense to have an economic theory 
without a State regulating and guaranteeing the market. But economists have 
always been tempted to declare their independence from the State. In the 
days of Adam Smith and Thomas Malthus, this aspiration of autonomy made 
sense, as the mercantilist State was an autocratic State that, more often than 
not, distorted, rather than corrected, the economic system. Likewise, it made 
sense to associate economic theory with Liberalism, because the emerging 
bourgeoisie needed more freedom for their business undertakings. The classical 
economists were suffi ciently realistic, however, to understand that their theory 
was not strictly economic, but also political – that politics and the State were 
not a hindrance (as Neoliberalism would later contend), but an integral part of 
economic system inasmuch as it regulated and guaranteed the market.
The market is a competition-driven mechanism of economic 
coordination. In order to coordinate the actions of the members of any social 
system – and, in particular, of an economic system producing goods and 
services –, we must always have two instruments at our disposal: management 
and market. Whereas management is a hierarchical system that turns the social 
system into a bureaucratic organization (the fi rm), defi nes its goals and chooses 
the most suitable means to achieve them, the market coordinates individual 
economic agents, families and economic organizations through competition 
– mainly for profi t (for companies), but also for better wages and salaries (for 
workers and professionals). The State hovers above every individual agent, 
family, organization and market, and coordinates them all. When it does 
so directly, it plans and intervenes in the production of goods and services. 
But this is not its main function. It is when it regulates the actions of all the 
members of society (by means of a Constitution, laws and public policies) and 
when, in the economic sphere, it institutes and regulates markets, that the State 
performs its highest and irreplaceable role.
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Theoretical Assault
In the last 30 years, a coalition between wealthy rentiers and a middle 
class of brilliant fi nancial professionals used Neoliberalism as an ideological 
instrument to get rich. I will not discuss here how this coalition came about 
(it is enough to say that it rose in the United States and Great Britain), nor 
how, afterward, it became the preferred tool for the wealthiest 2% of the 
population (in rich countries and in middle-income countries of Latin America) 
to appropriate high incomes for themselves. I will not show how, during this 
period, fi nancing (indispensable for an economic system to work properly) 
became “fi nancialization”, that is, the process of creating fi ctitious wealth 
and its appropriation by professional fi nanciers. Having established the basic 
relationship of complementariness and hierarchy between both the State and 
the market, what really interests me here is understanding the role that certain 
schools of thought (in particular, the neoclassical economic theory, the new 
institutionalism, the theory of public choice) in providing instruments for the 
assault of the neoliberal ideology against the State – an assault that, while it 
lasted, was successful in legitimizing a profound distortion in the development 
of capitalism.
The best known episode of the origin of Neoliberalism was the 
establishment, in the 1950s, in Mont Pelerin, Switzerland, under the leadership 
of Friedrich Hayek, of a American sense), among which were also Karl Popper, 
Ludwig von Mises and Milton Friedman. This chapter, however, was merely 
the precursor of Neoliberalism, not Neoliberalism per se, because the members 
of the group members were truly great liberal [i.e., conservative] intellectuals 
who struggled against communism – who fought, therefore, against an ideology 
and a political movement that intended to replace capitalism with socialism 
and the market with State planning. This is not the place to discuss how real 
the communist threat was and what were misunderstandings on either side 
of the table. At the time, there was a great dispute between two fundamental 
ideologies of modern societies, liberalism and socialism, which were thought to 
correspond to alternative forms of organizing production (capitalism and, was 
becoming clear there was no real economic alternative to capitalism but that 
this same capitalism might, perhaps, evolve into a social capitalism if workers 
managed join the middle classes to establish Welfare States.
Neoliberalism emerged with full strength in American economic science 
a little later on, in the 1960s, and expressed itself clearly in four thought 
currents: the neoclassical economic theory, the new institutionalism based on 
transaction costs, the theory of public choice and the theory of rational choice, 
which reduced politics to no more than a market. The four theories sketched a 
reductionist view of the State and of politics itself. Neoclassical economic theory 
demonstrated that the State’s regulatory actions were not needed, the new 
institutionalism converted the State into a “second best” vis-à-vis the market, 
the theory of public or social choice transformed the State into an inherently 
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corrupt organization and the more radical versions of rational choice reduced 
politics to profi ts and losses in the marketplace.
Economists were never able to clearly separate their science 
from ideology. It is not surprising, therefore, that when the now-called 
“neoclassical” economists decided to change the name of economic science 
from “political economy” to “economics” (in order to consummate the 
separation between politics and the economy, and between ideology and the 
market, turning economics into a “pure science” at last), economic science 
was transmogrifi ed into mere ideology. With this shift, they acknowledged 
that the economic fi eld or sphere had fi nally attained a reasonable degree 
of independence from the rest of society and become a science in its own 
right – yet they were unaware that this did not justify a “pure” economic 
theory and that this made them even more ideologically-minded (because, by 
aspiring to this kind purity, they concealed the political element inherent in 
the economy, even after the economic sphere was rendered autonomous by 
capitalism). Although one of the founders of the neoclassical school, Alfred 
Marshall, was one of the four or fi ve greatest economists in history (one has 
only to read his microeconomic analyses of markets), two tenets of this school 
– the subjective theory of value and the model of general equilibrium – were 
a veritable plunge into the darkness of ideology. In the latter half of the 20th 
century, neoclassical economic science turned the model of general equilibrium 
into an “idealist-realist” image of the capitalist system,3 while at the same 
time the macroeconomic theory of rational expectations demonstrated that 
no economic policies were needed to counter economic cycles. Since this 
new macroeconomics had already proven to be consistent with the general 
equilibrium, their growth models revealed the same picture. Amazingly, 
however, the main criterion of truth in this humongous theoretical system was 
not its consistency with reality or its ability to make predictions (as required of 
any substantive natural or social science), but rather its own internal coherence 
– the emblematic criterion of the methodological sciences. 
To make this aberration feasible, the method of choice was neither 
the empirical nor the historical (such as Adam Smith’s and Karl Marx’s), 
but the hypothetical-deductive (Bresser-Pereira, 2009). For this very reason, 
neoclassical economic theory became a purely hypothetical-deductive, purely 
mathematical science, a perfect demonstration of how markets are or tend to be 
self-regulated, and explained how the State was almost unnecessary and should 
remain only a guarantor of private property and the fulfi llment of contracts. 
In the latter half of the 20th century, after the emergence of Keynesian 
macroeconomics and of development economics, this insanity was temporarily 
halted. Not by chance, Keynesian macroeconomics and development economics 
were dominant between 1945 and 1975, the same period of capitalism’s 
“30 glorious years”. In the 1970s, however, the slackening of the developed 
economies, the falling interest rates and the stagfl ation phenomenon became a 
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golden opportunity for Neoliberalism to mount its assault on the social State 
and for neoclassical economic theory to recover its dominant mainstream 
position. With its macroeconomic and mathematical growth models based on 
rational expectations, neoclassical economic theory was once again capable of 
“demonstrating mathematically” the self-regulatory nature of the markets – 
a trait liable to be hampered only by some very surmountable market fl aws. 
Milton Friedman and Robert Lucas are the exponents of this successful two-
decade long struggle for the monopoly of legitimate knowledge and, with the 
model of Modigliani and Miller (1958), neoclassical economists were able to 
provide a fi nancial theory that posited that markets are intrinsically effi cient and 
independent both from the State and from the individual decisions of fi nancial 
managers. This radical economic determinism reached the pinnacle with Gary 
Becker’s models, which not only separated the economic sphere from the State 
and from every other aspect of life, but also imperiously determined these 
other realms.4 As Pierre Bourdieu observed (2000, p. 17-8), this separation 
involved an “ethical revolution” through which “the sphere of commercial 
trade was sundered from the other realms of life… and transactions ceased to 
be conceived according to the model of domestic trade commanded by familial 
obligations.” Gary Becker went way beyond that and reduced the totality of 
personal life to the economy.
More subtle, but equally radical, was the assault on the State perpetrated 
by the new institutionalism of Ronald Coase. Instead of practically ignoring 
the State, he decided to bring institutions back into economic theory. Many 
economists welcomed this decision, which seemed to increase the realism of 
economic theory and, perhaps, instill it with the character of political economy 
once again. However, the new institutionalism had nothing to do with the 
historical institutionalism of the German historical school, or the American 
institutionalism of John Commons and Thorstein Veblen, so signifi cant in 
the early decades of the 20th century. On the contrary, it was a hypothetical-
deductive institutionalism, much as the political theory of Thomas Hobbes’ 
and the Illuminist philosophers’ social contract. But much more radical. 
Whereas the contractualist philosophers deduced the State from the state of 
nature and the need for safety or order which only a sovereing could offer, the 
new institutionalism deduced each and every organization (the State included) 
from the costs of transactions. In order to do this, however, it must make a 
rather unbiblical assumption. If we read in the Bible that “In the beginning 
was the Word”, the new institutionalism implies that “In the beginning was 
the market”, i.e., in the beggining were individuals producing and trading 
under the coordination of the market. Not the mythical Adam and Eve, not 
the wandering tribes of gatherers, not the primitive communities studied 
by anthropologists and others, but competitive and rational individuals 
who nevertheless incurred in transaction costs. How did they solve this 
predicament? How did the reduce the costs of making transactions in the 
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market? Coase deduced they created organizations, including the State, for 
this purpose. Society was completely ignored. There were only individuals 
and “organizations” –understood in a much broader sense than the concept 
of bureaucratic organization, in general use since Max Weber. Organizations 
did not arise from the need to divide labor and cooperate – from a complex 
historical process, in other words –, but from the costs of transactions. The 
State of old mas not the historical outcome of increased productivity generating 
economic surplus (and its appropriation by stronger groups capable of imposing 
their law upon others and, thus, of coordinating all societal actions to their 
benefi t), but merely an organization formed by bureaucrats and politicians 
that is necessary to internalize (and reduce) part of the costs of trading in the 
market. The modern State did not arise from the historical formation of nations 
and nation-States, nor even from a contract, but always from the need to reduce 
the costs of transactions. For the new institutionalism, therefore, the State and 
other organizations become a second best. The ideal, the original and “natural” 
form of organizing society and the economy is the market – the market is the 
beginning of everything. In other words, the State is subordinate to the market, 
even if only because this reductionist view sees it not as a constitutional-legal 
system, not as a juridical order and the organization that guarantees it, but 
merely as an organization with special powers to legislate and tax.
The most radical assault on the State, however, was the one furthered 
by the theory of public choice. The name itself is Orwellian, rejecting as it 
does the very idea of a public ethics. For James Buchanan and Gordon Tullock, 
its main advocates, the State is also seen from a reductionist perspective as an 
organization. Only thus can they separate this State from something they surely 
cherish, namely, the American Constitution. But this was only the fi rst step that 
allowed them to take their assault on the State to the next stage. The State is 
not merely an organization. It is not merely an ineffi cient organization. It is also 
a criminal organization – an organization from which citizens are excluded and 
whose members are only interested in rent seeking.
Finally, we have the political scientists who advocated rational choice. 
This is a broad and sometimes contradictory area, about which it is dangerous 
to generalize. Its most general assumption is that the collective action of large 
groups is ineffi cient and is essentially hindered by the so-called free riders. 
Since society has no broader and more general collective action than the State, 
the latter is inevitably limited, ineffi cient and ineffective. It doesn’t matter 
that historical experience says otherwise. The reasoning here is also essentially 
hypothetical-deductive. What matters is the logic of societal actions, not its 
reality. We can, however, conceive the State and politics as a market. After 
the work of Anthony Downs (1957), the more radical currents of the theory 
of rational choice attempted to reduce the logic of politics to the logic of the 
marketplace. The economists’ assumption of a homo economicus is not absurd 
when one considers the actions of economic agents, who in capitalist societies 
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seek to maximize their gains. What is absurd in neoclassical theory is to start 
out from this assumption to build models decoupled from reality – models that 
are strictly hypothetical-deductive, whose criterion of truth is not its adequacy 
to reality and its ability to make predictions, but its logical coherence. Likewise, 
placing the homo economicus in politics is unacceptable, because this assumption 
goes against the very nature of politics and the public sphere. Whereas the logic 
of the market is the logic of profi t, the logic of politics is the public interest or 
the common good. We don’t expect more from an economic agent than the 
defense of their own interests within the law, but we do expect much more 
from citizens and from the offi cials of a Republic. The State includes among its 
members not only public servants and elected offi cials, but also every citizen – 
and all of them, in addition to seeking their own interests, are committed to 
the national interest. It is clear that public offi cials must make tradeoffs that go 
beyond personal interest versus public interest. Delving more analytically, we 
may think of two kinds of public offi cials: the “rational” ones, whose tradeoff is 
between rent seeking and the desire to be elected, and the “republicans”, whose 
tradeoff is between the desire to be elected and the public interest. The theory 
of public choice and the more radical version of rational choice do not even 
admit the fi rst tradeoff: the only conceivable goal is rent seeking and, therefore, 
the State organization is criminal. There are, however, more moderate currents 
of the theory of rational choice that admit the fi rst tradeoff, and even the 
second, but these are now ceasing to become true advocates of rational choice.
Are all players of this intellectual drama neoliberals? The question is 
meaningless, because there is in every ideology a fundamental unconscious 
element that is all the greater the more hegemonic the ideology is. The 
historical defi nition of Neoliberalism I gave at the beginning of this essay, 
when I compared it with Liberalism, is a radical defi nition that for most 
people is only applicable because it is unconscious. Whereas Liberalism was the 
revolutionary ideology of a bourgeois middle class that struggled against an 
oligarchic and autocratic State, Neoliberalism was the reactionary ideology of 
the rich against the poor and against a social democratic State. Even if Marx 
and Engles brought ideology closer to the conscious sphere by exposing it, this 
change was not suffi ciently great for us to label as cynics those who associated 
themselves with Neoliberalism. Many of the intellectuals who identifi ed 
themselves with these theories did not share the goals of Neoliberalism and 
did not benefi t from it. They believed they were making science – a science 
that, by assuming a simple type of man, allowed the construction of beautiful 
and precise mathematical models that could be later used to bring order and 
clarity to economic policies. Many others thought they were defending public 
morality by denouncing public offi cials as rent seekers (such corruption, by 
the way, is not as widespread as they claimed, but is indeed always present 
among government offi cials and even more so among the capitalists who 
corrupt them). In reality, however, by adopting the assumptions of neoclassical 
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economic theory and the theory of public choice, they were contributing to 
lower the moral standards of all economists, as confi rmed by the studies of 
Robert Frank and others (1993, 1996), published in the Journal of Economic 
Perspectives, showing that American doctoral students who major in Economics 
have substantially lower ethical standards than their peers in other fi elds. With 
the dominance of neoclassical economic theory, never was so much spoken 
about transparency and trustworthy policies, never was corruption so criticized 
(the World Bank, for instance, became a kind of anticorruption agency), but 
never have the moral standards of economists and managers been so low. It was 
not by chance that John Kenneth Galbraith’s last book (2004) was called The 
economics of innocent fraud.
Since the early 1980s, these theories and Neoliberalism went 
mainstream and the State started being seen as an obstacle. Politics was 
identifi ed with corruption, or the dishonest quest for income, or with 
economic populism.  Neoclassical economic theory, the model of general 
equilibrium, the macroeconomics of rational expectations and the growth 
models became a meta-ideology, the leading justifi cation for the fundamental 
assertion of Neoliberalism, namely, the assumption of self-regulated markets. 
This ideological character of neoclassical economics becomes even clearer 
if we consider that its macroeconomic and economic growth theories were 
totally useless in the practical life of nations. They did not guide their 
macroeconomic policy or their economic development policies; they only 
guided only their own ideological proposals for deregulation. The testimony 
of one of their most representative macroeconomists, Gregory Mankiw 
(2006), leaves no room for doubt. After a two-year tenure as chairman of the 
Council of Economic Advisers, he stated that neoclassical macroeconomics 
was not used by policy makers in Washington; on the contrary, what is used is 
“a kind of engineering” inspired by Keynes. The more general ideas regarding 
deregulation, however, proved themselves “useful”, because they legitimized 
the deregulation of fi nancial markets, which led to the fi nancialization of 
these markets, to an enormous concentration of income and, fi nally, to the 
great economic crisis of 2008.
The theory of public choice, by reducing the State and its offi cials to the 
status of rent seekers and citizens to the condition of mere economic agents 
seeking to protect their interests, might have, nevertheless, contributed to 
improve the moral standards of politics, but we’ve seen that the result was quite 
the opposite. By denying the possibility that men and women of the Republic 
might actually seek something more than their own selfi sh advantage, this and 
the other theories seen here legitimized the exclusive quest of self-interest – 
which, within the limits of the law, would become the general interest through 
the invisible hand of the market. Thus, in addition to being scientifi cally wrong, 
because moral and republican values are also powerful motivators of human 
behavior, they debased the moral and civic values of citizens and claimed that 
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civic education was unnecessary. We are all well aware that these values do not 
prevent transgression; but when they are shared by society as a whole, they 
strengthen the institutions that were established in accordance with those values 
and became an invaluable heritage of that society.
The assault on the State and on the market mounted by Neoliberalism 
can be thought of in cyclical terms, as I myself did in the late 1980s, when the 
new ideological wave was reaching its crest – this, by the way, enabled me to 
foresee that it would soon deplete itself (Bresser-Pereira, 1989). In this were so, 
the process of liberalization would only be rectifying the distortions created by 
excessive State intervention in the economy during the previous cycle. However, 
even if there was a cyclical element in the economic and political process that 
culminated in the current crisis, I don’t believe its legitimate to reduce the 
whole problem to a cyclical issue. The 30 glorious years of capitalism were not 
State-driven or State-enhancing, and the neoliberal reaction was much more 
radical than a simple cyclical process could possibly justify. In Latin America, 
during this period, there was strong State intervention, but this corresponded 
to the peculiar stage of development of most countries in the region, not to 
statism. On the other hand, neoliberal violence against the State was aimed 
not only at the producer State, but also at the State inducer of development 
and at the State as enabler of people. It was, in short, an ideology against the 
most advanced form of State humankind has been able to build until now: the 
social democratic State. In other words, it was not a cyclical correction and did 
not correspond to a necessary characteristic of capitalism; on the contrary, it 
was its perversion. By engaging in politics and building a State, societies have 
attempted to regulate and mold capitalism in accordance with its values, its 
political objectives. They have developed a system that combines regulation 
by the State and by the market that is admittedly far from ideal, that is always 
in dire need of correction, but has demonstrated in the recent past that it can 
be instrumental in providing more security, more liberty, more prosperity, 
more equality and better environmental protection. This process of political 
construction was interrupted and reversed, but there is no reason for it not be 
resumed now.
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Notes
1 By State, singular, I mean the fundamental institution of a political-territorial unit (the 
country or nation-State). However, especially in international relations, when we speak of 
“States”, plural, we are referring to countries or nation-States themselves.
2 The Diccionario Enciclopédico Salvat (Barcelona, 1954), for instance, defi nes radical liber-
alism as one with full independence between State and Church.
3 Idealist, because the general equilibrium would imply a perfect market; realist, because, 
nevertheless, it purported to be a realistic theory of the economic system.
4 Foucault (2004) was probably the fi rst to criticize this aspect of Neoliberalism.
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ABSTRACT – State and market are complementary institutions. The State is the major 
institution coordinating modern societies; it is the constitutional system and the organizations 
that guarantee it; it is the main instrument through which democratic societies have been 
changing capitalism to achieve their own political objectives. Markets are competition-based 
institutions regulated by the State so that they contribute to the coordination of the economy. 
While Liberalism emerged in the 18th century to fi ght an autocratic State, Neoliberalism (a 
major distortion of economic Liberalism) became dominant since the 1980s and mounted a 
political assault on the State in the name of the market, but eventually also attacked the market. 
Neoclassical macroeconomics and the theory of public choice were the meta-ideologies that 
gave a “scientifi c” and mathematical allure to this assault.
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